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Abstract—A novel Strict Friendliness Verification (SFV) 
scheme based on the integrated key consisting of symmetric 
node identity, geographic location and round trip response 
time between the sender and the receiver radio in MANET is 
proposed. This key is dynamically updated for encryption and 
decryption of each packet to resolve Wormhole attack and 
Sybil attack. Additionally, it meets the minimal key lengths 
required for symmetric ciphers to provide adequate 
commercial security. Furthermore, the foe or unfriendly node 
detection is found significantly increasing with the lower 
number of symmetric IDs. This paper presents the simulation 
demonstrating the performance of SFV in terms of dynamic 
range using directional antenna on radios (or nodes), and the 
performance in terms of aggregate throughput, average end to 
end delay and packet delivered ratio.   
      Keywords- Integrated key; Strict Friendliness Verification; 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks ; Wormhole Attack; Sybil Attack; Foe 
Detection Rate.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
     Geographic based friendly node identification requires 
location tracking and moving patterns of the radios within 
MANET environment. Using directional antenna on each 
node can provide better spatial use of bandwidth and energy 
efficient preventive solutions for wormhole attacks. 
Additionally, symmetric IDs can be dynamically changed to 
solve Sybil attack of multiples false identities. All these 
issues are required to be addressed for strict friendliness 
verification between neighbor nodes in MANET, before 
nodes participate in the direct or multi-hop communications. 
This is accomplished by packets encryption and decryption 
using robust integration of different partial keys for each 
packet so that neighbors can be declared as strict friendly 
radios (also referred to as nodes). For encryption and 
decryption, a set of partial keys are generated from the 
private information of nodes that includes location 
information (including distance and direction of node), 
symmetric ID and round trip time (RTT) of preamble packet 
between two neighboring nodes to maintain the anonymity. 
This prevents possible replay from the Wormhole attackers, 
Sybil attackers and foe nodes.  
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides 
the related work; Section III describes anonymous 
geographic parameters; Section IV describes security 
against Wormhole attacks and Sybil attacks; Section V 
describes proposed Strict Friendliness Verification scheme; 
Section VI derives Foe (Unfriendly) nodes detection rate; 
Section VII describes performance & evaluation and 
followed by conclusion in Section VIII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
     Wormhole prevention mechanism deploys ‘packet 
leashes’ containing timing and Global Positioning System 
(GPS) information to each packet on a hop-by-hop basis [1] 
and end to end basis [2] to verify the actual physical 
distance covered by packets. Furthermore, an end-to-end 
mechanism based on geographic information detects 
anomalies in neighbor relations and node movements [3]. 
But, it has some drawbacks that it misses some anomalies as 
the records falling into the same slot and the same cluster 
might be ignored. Additionally, detection of malicious 
nodes is to protect the location discovery and detection of 
replay signals is to avoid false positives services [4]. These 
issues can be addressed by deploying the proposed 
integrated key based security scheme. 
 
A directional information sharing can prevent 
wormhole endpoints from being camouflaged as false 
neighbors and reduce the intimidation of wormhole attacks, 
without any location information or clock synchronization 
[5], [7]. This scheme does not address the prevention from 
multiple endpoint attacks, which requires substantial 
amount of energy consumption. On the other hand, secure 
localization (SeRLoc) uses the geometric and radio range 
information to detect the wormhole attack and the Sybil 
attack on localization scheme in which only few nodes are 
equipped with directional antennas [8] which is an issue in 
the overall design of a MANET. These can be alleviated by 
the proposed scheme by using location information, 
symmetric IDs and RTT assets to generate integrated key 
for strict friendly verification and multiple endpoints attacks 
cannot succeed any more.  
  
Related key cryptanalysis is a real-time attack in the 
key integrity on the key-exchange protocols by an attacker 
flipping bits in the key without knowing the key and key 
function. This can be resolved by designing keys such that a 
key in each round is randomly generated to prevent any 
related key cryptanalysis [12]. This can be made more 
advanced by using different partial keys generated from 
2011 International Conference on Security Science and Technology(ICSST 2011)
1978-1-4244-8769-1 /11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE 
random number generator functions on each round keys 
using different seeds so that related key cryptanalysis can be 
deciphered. On the other hand, it is necessary to increase the 
key sizes gradually for effective countermeasures against 
new cryptanalytic insights to maintain a comfortable margin 
of security. This is based on explicitly formulated 
parameters and existing cryptosystems in symmetric 
cryptosystems, RSA, and discrete logarithm based 
cryptosystems [13]. This key size issue is addressed by 
designing optimal bits length integrated key scheme for 
commercial security.  
III. ANONYMOUS GEOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS 
Each radio or node has unique geographic location and 
RTT assets which can be deployed as anonymous 
geographic parameters for strict friendliness. The location 
information includes radial or scalar Euclidean distance and 
angle between the sender and receiver which are computed 
from the average time difference of TOA (Time of Arrival) 
and TOD (Time of Departure) and the angular bearing by 
AOA (Angle of Arrival) for ith number of packets. The 
radial distance (DRadial) between sender and receiver is 
computed as the average time difference of arrival time of 
preamble packet at receiver and departure time of response 
from receiver to sender as follows:. 
 
1
1 2
1        [ { ( )}]       (1)
                                            (2)
n
Radial i i
i
D c ToD ToA
n
RTT T T
=
= −
= −
∑  
where, 
Speed of light (c) = 3×108 m/ sec 
No. of packets for ranging (n) = 3 packets 
Transmission time from sender to receiver (T1) 
 Responding time from receiver to sender (T2) 
 
In AOA, directional antenna-arrays are used to estimate 
the direction of arrival (θ) of the signal of interest and a 
single AOA measurement constrains the source along a line. 
The precision of AOA depends upon the line of sight 
between sender and receiver. Additionally, RTT (Round 
Trip Time) is computed as the total time elapsed between 
the transmission and the reception of the acknowledgement 
for ith number of packet. This round trip time includes the 
propagation delay of the packet traveling in both directions 
and processing delay. The computed ,  and 
Radial
D AOA RTT  
assets must be lower or equal to their corresponding 
maximum range value,  _ ,  and Max Radial Max MaxD AOA RTT  so that 
the sender’s request has not been “replayed” by wormhole 
or local nodes and proceed as seeds towards strict 
friendliness. Otherwise, the sender’s request is rejected and 
needs to repeat with a second attempt with 
another ,  and RadialD AOA RTT  assets. 
IV. SECURITY AGAINST WORM HOLE AND SYBIL ATTACKS 
Wormhole attack is the direct network link to eaves 
drop messages at one point of the network and replay at 
another point, which sever multi hop spatial reuse in mobile 
wireless ad hoc networks. Wormhole attacks deploy the 
encrypted packets which they overhear from the legitimate 
nodes and replay them to create a major issue in filtering 
those packets by any preventive cryptographic measures. In 
Fig. 1, node A has off channel link known as tunnel to node 
B and replay cipher packets between node C and D. This 
issue can be addressed by using real time location 
information achieved from directional antenna, symmetric 
ID and RTT assets to generate the integrated key for strict 
friendly verification before multi hop routing of packets. 
Real time geographical information and RTT cannot be 
replayed by the wormhole attackers as they are only virtual 
nodes with off-channel link. Even though they become 
capable to replay the encrypted packet with the integrated 
key, it will be no longer accepted by strict friendly verifier 
because two identical encrypted packets do not exist in the 
proposed SFV scheme. The reasoning is that the integrated 
key is dynamically generated from the pseudo random 
number generation functions using two different seeds 
(Location, RTT) as well as data packet, and changeable 
symmetric ID.  
 
  
Fig. 1 Wormhole Attack                 Fig. 2 Sybil Attack 
 
Sybil attack is the adversary or illegitimate use of the 
multiple identities to function as distinct nodes 
masquerading. It is similar to wormhole attack as it also 
replays the encrypted packets but using false identity. This 
can attack the distributed storage, routing, data aggregation, 
voting, fair resource allocation and misbehavior detection. 
In Fig. 2, node S adversary uses the secret keys (identities) 
of three nodes N, O and P to replay node X as three 
different nodes. Node X gets the false realization of three 
more direct neighbors N, O and P except node R and S. This 
type of bogus polymorphism identities are commended to be 
strictly verified by a legitimate node. This issue is addressed 
by using a bunch of symmetric IDs along the location 
information and RTT for the integrated key generation. The 
symmetric ID of a node is dynamically changed on each 
link establishment to another node. Additionally, each 
packet is encrypted or decrypted by different integrated key 
and replay cannot fraud verifier, which possesses its 
robustness.     
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V. PROPOSED STRICT FRIENDLINESS VERIFICATION 
SCHEME 
Neighbor nodes are essential to legitimately verify them 
as strictly friends so that they can co-operate in the secured 
location tracking through multi-hop communication. The 
novel key in encryption and decryption for the strict 
friendliness verification deploy 90 bits length integrated key 
and 12 bytes block size, which accomplish the minimal key 
lengths for symmetric ciphers to provide adequate 
commercial security. The novel integrated key is generated 
as 90 bits key K= (K1 K2 K3) consisting 32 bits key (K1), 26 
bits key (K2) and 32 bits key (K3) to encrypt the packet at 
the transmitter end. Each node generates K1 as pseudo 
random number using initial seed (i-1) in the RNG1 function,   
K2 is 26 bits unique IDTx of a node and   K3 is generated by 
the encryption of the first packet with the random number 
generated from RNG2 function using initial seed (n-1). 
Furthermore, the initial seed (i-1) for K1, is the location 
information (distance and direction) between transmitter and 
receiver whereas the initial seed (n-1) for K2, is the RTT of 
preamble packet between them. Then, first ensemble packet 
is encrypted using the first key K generated from the 
integration of the location information, RTT and symmetric 
ID.  Similarly,  the  second key K´= (K´1 K´2 K´3) is the 
integration of K´1, generated from RNG1 function using first 
halve of key K as seed i, K´2  same as K2 (symmetric ID) 
and K´3, generated from RNG2 function using second halve 
of key K as seed n. Then, the second ensemble packet is 
encrypted using second key K´ and this encryption 
procedure is iterated for next packets. The cipher packets Cj 
for jth number of plain    ensemble    packets     are    
computed    using   key kj in encryption as shown in Fig. 3 
using the following equations:      
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At the receiver end, the first packet is decrypted by 
using key K=(K1 K2 K3)  where, K1 is the 32 bits key 
generated using initial seed (i-1) which is the location 
information between transmitter and receiver in RNG1,  K2 
is the 26 bits unique IDRx of node and   K3 is 32 bits key 
generated by the decryption of the first encrypted packets 
with the random number generated from RNG2 function 
using the initial seed (n-1) which is the RTT between 
transmitter and receiver. Regarding second packet, the 
decryption is done by changing K´1 and K´3 generated by 
RNG functions with new seeds achieved after halving the 
previous key and this decryption procedure is iterated for 
next packets. The plain ensemble packets Pj for jth number of 
cipher packets are computed using keys kj in decryption as 
shown in Fig. 4 using the following equations:  
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The receiver is declared as a friendly neighbor node, 
when encrypted packets from the transmitter are 
successfully decrypted by the receiver. It can be used for 
direct or multi hop communication. If not, the node is 
deemed as a suspicious node and is not authorized for 
communications. This process of strict friendliness 
verification between neighbors is required each time for 
secure path connectivity for information exchange. 
 
Fig. 3 Packet Encryption for Strict Friendly Verification 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Packet Decryption for Strict Friendly Verification 
 
Regarding the symmetric cipher, higher keys length 
protect against brute force attacks. Increasing each bit in the 
key increases twice the number of possible keys and yields 
two times more search for the brute force attack. With 90-
bits key, the complexity analysis of algorithm needs O (290) 
= 1.237940039 × 1027 runs for the brutal force search. On 
average, a brute force attack must check half of the total 
runs, performing 289 encryptions, to find the key. This 90 
bits key length is enough for the symmetric ciphers to 
provide plentiful commercial security. 
 
The detection rate is the probability of detecting an 
unfriendly or foe node in MANET cluster which evaluates 
the detection performance of strict friendliness verification 
scheme. Let us consider a suspicious  transmitting node 
sends request to the receiver node,  such that it could 
persuade as a friendly node and avoid being detected during 
the strict friendly verification process, with  the probability 
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of replayed by wormholes (pwh), probability of  node’s ID 
replay (pi) and  the probability of locally RTT replayed (pr) 
by neighbors.  Then, the probability of detection of replayed 
by wormholes is (1-pwh), the probability of detection of 
node’s ID replay is (1-pi) and the probability of detection of 
locally RTT replayed (1-pr) in the strict friendliness 
verification. The probability of suspicious node detection by 
a friendly node is computed as: 
 
             (1 )(1 )(1 )                    (13)wh i rP p p p= − − −  
    
When each detecting node having n detection IDs, the 
detection rate or probability (Pdr) of a suspicious node being 
detected by a kind friendly detecting node can be computed 
as: 
 
1 (1 ) 1 {1 (1 )(1 )(1 )}    (14)n ndr wh i rP p p p p= − − = − − − − −  
 
This implies that unless the detection probability 
increases, the detection rate cannot be increased. A kind 
friendly detecting node can significantly increase the 
detection rate using higher number of symmetric IDs. Figure 
5 shows that the transmitter detection rate increases with the 
higher number of Symmetric IDs changing at receiver 
because it increases the robustness against replay attacks.  
 
VI. SIMULATION AND PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION  
The simulation is performed using 80 nodes in each 
cluster of size 300 X 300 sq. m, for 10 different clusters in 
3000 X 3000 sq. m terrain area deploying the proposed 
Strict Friendly Verification scheme for neighbor nodes as 
shown in Fig. 6 using simulation parameters from Table 1 
[3]. The location information is computed from the average 
time difference of TOA and TOD of the preamble packet 
and the AOA of preamble packet determined by the 
directional antenna arrays. Similarly, RTT is computed from 
the TOA packets in the time domain. Both the location 
information and the RTT are taken using the ranging and 
non-ranging methods. In the ranging method, the 
transmission power is increased  while  scanning  for  the 
neighbor nodes. The first 
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Fig. 5 Detection Rate analysis 
 
scanning is done by transmitter at the range of 230 m using 
steerable  directional  antenna and if it could  not  find  any 
desired node then second scanning is done at the range of 
250m by increasing the transmission power and similarly, 
third scanning is done at the range of 270 m. The major 
advantage of the ranging method is that it utilizes the 
minimum transmission power to the optimum extent, where 
as the non-ranging method uses the full power to cover the 
full transmission range of 270 m at the first instance. 
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Fig. 6 Strict Friendly Verification Deployment Scenario 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Unfriendly Nodes’ Detection in Different Clusters 
 
To detect the unfriendly nodes, the transmitter 
generates a 90 bit key, K = (K1 K2 K3) consisting 32 bit key 
(K1) generated from RNG1 using location information as 
the seed, a unique ID for the node as a 26 bit key (K2) and a 
32 bit key (K3) generated by the encryption of the first 
packet with RNG2 value with RTT as the seed. This key, K 
is used to encrypt the first packet at the transmitter end.  
Similarly, the second packet is encrypted by another 90 bit 
key, K’=(K’1 K’2 K’3)  where K’1 is generated using a new 
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Suspicious Neighbor Node Detection
TABLE -I 
SFV SIMULATION PARAMETERS 
Simulation parameters Values 
Area (sq.m) 3000 X 3000 
Radio range (m) 230, 250, 270 
Nodes in each cluster 80 
Transmission rate (Kbps) 200-2000 
Mobility model Random Waypoint Model 
Traffic Type CBR (UDP) 
Packet size (Bytes) 512 
Node speed (m/s)        5-50 
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seed generated from the first half of the key, K and K’3 as 
the second half of the key, K. Similarly, receiver performs 
the reverse operation of above to decrypt both first and 
second packets using corresponding seeds and its symmetric 
ID. If the packets are successfully decrypted and verified, 
the receiving node is verified as a strict friendly neighbor, 
otherwise, it is deemed as a suspicious node. From our 
simulation, a maximum of 33 nodes are detected in third 
clusters as suspicious nodes as shown in Fig. 7. On the other 
hand, a maximum 62 are verified and declared as strict 
friendly neighbor nodes in the second and fifth clusters as 
shown in Fig. 8.  
 
     Similarly, we verified nodes as unfriendly or suspicious 
nodes by deploying different number of symmetric IDs 
during the verification process and included wormhole and 
RTT. Noting that the wormhole and RTT replay are external 
or out-of-hand to a detecting node and application of 
symmetric keys is in-hand for robust friendly node 
verification, we demonstrated the detection rate to be 30-
40%  for a single  ID,  50 - 60 % for two  IDs,  70 - 85 % for  
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Fig. 8 Verified Strict Friendly Nodes 
 
four IDs, 95% for six IDs and almost 100% for eight IDs. 
Figure 9 shows the verified strict friendly nodes in different 
clusters. This outstanding detection rate of almost 100% is 
achieved by using eight different symmetric keys for strictly 
friend verification in all clusters because, the ID replay 
entirely solved as the best case. This can be better illustrated 
by the detection rate analysis which shows that if the 
detection rate by a single ID is about 30-40% then detection 
rate will be approximately 100% using more than six 
symmetric IDs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
symmetric IDs of more than six yield outstanding detection 
rate, Pdr6 =1-(1-P)6, where as the detection rate using a single 
ID, Pdr1 =1-(1-P) yields about 40% resulting from P= 
(1−pwh)(1−pi)(1−pr).         
 
Throughput is the average rate of successful packets 
delivery over a communication channel which becomes 
saturated at a certain transmission rate when the channel 
capacity is fully utilized. The throughput is drastically 
increasing with increasing transmission rate and then 
saturated from the transmission rate of 600 Kbps and the 
saturated throughputs are approximately 1000 Kbps without 
SFV, 950 Kbps in SFV without ranging and 900 kbps in 
SFV with ranging as shown in Fig. 10.  The saturated 
throughput is achieved when the queue scheduling optimize 
the successful packets’ transmission.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Unfriendly nodes Detection Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average end to end delay is the time consumed for 
transmission of packets from the application layer of the 
transmitter to the reception of those packets at the 
application layer of the receiver. The network packets 
increase when the size of the queue increases and the yield 
increased average end-to-end delay for the delivered packets. 
The delay is found drastically increasing in the beginning as 
the transmission rate is increased up to 1000 Kbps and then 
saturates in all cases. The average end to end delay is found 
approximately saturated to 1.7 seconds using SFV, 2.0 
seconds using SFV as well as ranging and 1.5 seconds 
without SFV as shown in Fig. 11. The saturation delay is 
achieved when the queue is full. 
Fig. 11 Average End to end delay versus Transmission Rate 
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Packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the packets 
successfully received at receiver to packets generated at the 
transmitter. Packet delivery ratio decreases with increasing 
speed because of the link failure issue in frequently 
changing directional range. This result in packet delivery 
ratio drastically bogged down for higher mobility which is 
almost same up to 20 m/s in all cases and sharply drops 
down in SFV with ranging due to selection of range and 
processing delay as shown in Fig. 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 Packet Delivered Ratio versus Speed 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the proposed integrated key based SFV addressed both 
the geographic information as well as anonymous symmetric 
identity of node, to resolve Wormhole and Sybil attacks in 
MANET. The detection rate of foe nodes is found to be 95% 
using six symmetric IDs in simulation. SFV with ranging 
have similar performance in terms of aggregate throughput, 
average end to end delay and packet delivered ratio as 
compared to SFV and without SFV. In conclusion, the SFV 
with dynamic ranging has significantly lower computational 
overhead, which makes it pragmatic and reliable in real-time 
co-operative MANET.    
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